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9
Politics, capital and land grabs 
in Punjab, India
Nicolas Martin
Engaging critically with the concept of ‘political society’, this chapter exam-
ines the issue of land grabbing in Punjab, and focusses in particular upon the 
systematic small-scale encroachment on village communal land in a rural 
Punjab district. It shows how politicians often help farmers to continue occu-
pying village common lands illegally, doing so for electoral gains not neces-
sarily consistent with the logic of ‘the market’ or of capital. In these cases, 
politicians seem to be driven by political motives related to electoral calcu-
lations rather than solely by financial ones. However, the chapter illustrates 
how these clientelistic bargains ultimately serve politicians and local elites 
more than they do those facing the prospect of dispossession.
This chapter offers an ethnographic perspective on land grabs in Punjab, 
focussing in particular on processes of appropriation of village common 
lands in rural Punjab: land that should in theory be available for rent 
to the highest bidder and of which a third is reserved for members of 
the Scheduled Castes (SCs). I argue that the processes at stake are some-
what different to those emphasised in the growing literature on land 
grabbing, which focusses on how capitalist accumulation by elite interest 
groups dispossesses the poor (Whitehead 2008; Adnan 2013; Springer 
2013). This literature tends to draw on David Harvey’s (2004) notion 
of accumulation by dispossession and sees land grabs as the result of 
over- accumulated capital seeking new opportunities for profit. As such, 
it tends to focus on ‘land grabbing’ projects that displace thousands of 
villagers or urban dwellers in order to make space for Special Economic 
Zones or real estate developments (Adnan 2013; Levien 2011; Sampat 
2010; Cross 2014). In this chapter, however, I focus principally on more 
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routinised and small-scale processes around encroachment on village 
common lands in a rural Punjabi district. As Geert De Neve (2015) has 
argued, ‘large scale state-led land grabs and mass displacements do not 
form the only – and perhaps not even the main – form that [primary] 
accumulation takes in post-reform India’.
Partha Chatterjee (2008) has argued that in post-liberalisation 
India, politicians are more than ever subject to the hegemony of corpo-
rate capital; corporate capital flows rather than electoral mobilisation are 
increasingly dominating politics, he argues. This is because state-level 
leaders are competing with each other in order to attract the capital that 
is necessary to generate economic growth. Corporate capital is gradually 
pauperising small farmers, small shopkeepers and indigenous commu-
nities. Corporate land grabs are one of the many ways this is happening. 
The concentration of capital also means that large retail and agribusiness 
companies can put small shopkeepers and small farmers out of business 
through the use of economies of scale and/or loss-leaders which under-
cut their prices. Civil society and the judiciary, he argues, are complicit in 
these processes. The middle classes, as Baviskar (2011) also shows, are 
tired of the messy reality of electoral politics. For example: the world of 
politics is the reason why, in their view, urban landscapes are blemished 
with illegal slums. It is politicians who allow people illegally to occupy 
land because they obtain votes in exchange for favours. The middle 
classes want the law to be implemented and the slums to be cleared.
The ad hoc illegal arrangements that prevent squatters from being 
evicted are the defining characteristic of what Chatterjee calls political 
society. The sphere of political society is one that operates on the margins 
of or even outside the law; it is a sphere in which politicians circumvent 
or break the law in order to appease popular pressures. For Chatterjee, 
political society has the merit of, for example, providing slum dwellers 
with a place to live, even though it might not give them the secure legal 
rights to settle permanently. Were politicians to stick to the letter of the 
law, slum dwellers would find themselves on the street. As such, he has 
argued that what he calls the sphere of political society is in fact the prin-
cipal sphere of activity where resistance to capital and to primitive accu-
mulation takes place. Its main achievement is to prevent the dispossessed 
from turning into ‘dangerous classes’ who have nothing to lose and are 
therefore potentially revolutionary.
In this chapter however, I show how so-called ‘political society’ can 
also be complicit in processes of dispossession. The dynamics around 
land grabbing that I describe here – particularly in the case of village com-
mon lands in rural Punjab – bear the imprint of political meddling that 
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is informed by the prerogatives of electoral politics rather than, strictly 
speaking, those of corporate capital. But what this chapter shows – ech-
oing previous work (Martin 2014) – is that the ad hoc clientelistic bar-
gains characteristic of political society can overwhelmingly benefit local 
elites at the expense of subordinate social groups (Dalits in particular). 
Moreover it illustrates how the frequently partisan nature of clientelistic 
interventions means that they further benefit some people at the expense 
of others. This makes these interventions a cause for conflict and social 
division, and therefore prevents people from getting together in order to 
find genuine political solutions to protecting their livelihoods.
The material presented is based on 15 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork starting in 2013 in villages around a tehsil (sub-district) head-
quarters within Patiala district, together with some research in the urban 
tehsil headquarters itself. Much of the material presented is based on 
interviews with interested parties in a number of land disputes. Given 
the hotly contested nature of these disputes, and that everyone has their 
own version of events, I attempt to triangulate people’s different versions 
and points of view. I begin with the broader picture of land grabbing at 
the state and tehsil level and its relationship with politics, and then move 
on to examine three case studies of village-common land grabs. In these 
case studies, politicians often intervene in order to allow supporters to 
continue possessing village common lands illegally against the logic of 
the market – much like Chatterjee’s politicians who help slum dwellers to 
continue encroaching upon land that does not belong to them. Were ‘the 
logic of the market’ to prevail, this land would go to the highest bidder, 
and prices for the lease of village common lands would rise significantly. 
Based on these case studies I try to determine whether it is in fact, as 
Chatterjee seems to suggest, the poor and lower caste who most benefit 
from these interventions. Moreover, I examine whether and how these 
political interventions succeed in preventing the popular unrest that 
arises out of the dispossession that accompanies the expansion of capital 
in agriculture.
Shiromani Akali Dal: ‘Goonda Raj’ and property grabs 
in Punjab
During the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) party’s two terms in power in Pun-
jab, people frequently claimed that it had instituted a reign of goonda 
raj (thugs) that was just as bad as the one in Bihar under Laloo Yadav 
Prasad. People – even lifelong Akalis – frequently claimed that corruption 
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and criminality in the Punjab was at its worst. Everywhere people told 
me that tehsildars (revenue collector at the tehsil level), Block Develop-
ment Officers and police Superintendent House Officers (SHOs) were 
forced to provide tens of lakh1 every month to their local MLA. While 
this was nothing new – as Robert Wade’s (1985) work on the market 
for public office in India illustrates – people claimed that the extent of 
these exactions was unprecedented. In the tehsil headquarters, I mostly 
heard about police exactions. Transporters complained about incessant 
harassment. People also complained about an SHO nicknamed ‘Dabang’ 
because he acted and behaved like a gangster. One local transporter told 
me that Dabang had asked him to gift him a new motorcycle.
Many informants alleged that in the past corruption in the state 
happened only at the highest levels. Congress leaders in the state, they 
claimed, only took money from big business, whereas the Akali govern-
ment – then in its second term – took money from everyone. The party 
leadership allegedly had shares in every business in the state, from media 
outlets to dhabas (roadside restaurants) and bus services to commer-
cial property and industry. Businessmen who refused to pay tribute to 
the party leadership faced bureaucratic hurdles that caused their busi-
nesses to shut down. Police officers harassed transporters by asking them 
to produce documents that they were unlikely to possess. In the tehsil 
headquarters, the leader of the Tempu (light transport vehicles) Union 
described a protection racket whereby the Ministry of Transport issued 
SAD party membership cards that essentially gave Tempu drivers immu-
nity from police harassment. Cardholders paid INR 150 per month, which 
was allegedly distributed among local police officers who consequently 
let them go without checking their documents, and who even let them 
get away with transporting illegal liquor and drugs. Likewise, a lucrative 
dhaba might find that if it did not pay tribute, its licence might be with-
drawn, or that the police might discourage customers from patronising 
it by not allowing them to park near it. On a more sinister note, people 
claimed that the ruling coalition controlled organised crime in the state. 
The Congress-leaning English-language press in the state often reported 
on the misdemeanours of Youth Akali Dal (YAD) leaders. The YAD was 
essentially the strong arm of the SAD and was used to harass opponents, 
rig elections and, it appears, distribute drugs – principally bhukki (poppy 
husk) – to purchase votes during elections. A close relative of the Chief 
Minister controlled the outfit and there were widespread rumours about 
how he used them as a sena (private army) in his home constituency. 
Throughout the state YAD youths used their police immunity to settle 
personal vendettas and to make money through drug trafficking and the 
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capture of disputed properties. In 2013–4 one of the main stories domi-
nating the press related to allegations that the head of the YAD was also 
the lynchpin of the drug trade in Punjab. These allegations came to light 
after a notorious drug smuggler was captured and interrogated by the 
police (Sehgal 2014).
Moreover, the SAD politicians stood widely accused of involve-
ment in a variety of land grabbing schemes. One of the SAD’s manifesto 
pledges was to build motorways linking all major cities in Punjab. The 
process of acquiring land from farmers to build these motorways was 
murky, and well-connected Akali politicians were widely believed to 
have amassed significant amounts of money through it. The farmers who 
had to sell their land to make way for these projects felt cheated. There 
were stories, for example, about Akali middlemen buying land from 
farmers at low prices and then reselling it to the government at much 
higher prices (Vasudeva 2016). Farmers in one village alleged that influ-
ential people had spread false rumours to the effect that the middleman 
in question was going to pay them more than the government would be 
willing to pay. The rumours even suggested that the government might 
not give farmers any compensation whatsoever so that it was best to 
accept the middleman’s offer. There were also plenty of stories about 
land grabs around expanding urban centres. Land prices around cities 
such as Chandigarh, Ludhiana, Patiala and Bathinda have skyrocketed in 
recent years. There were stories about moderately prosperous Jat farm-
ers becoming  multi-millionaires because their farmland happened to be 
located in urban peripheries that were being incorporated into the cities. 
High land values led to a scramble for land located on these peripheries. 
I also read and heard about a number of cases in which politically influ-
ential people were alleged to have somehow managed – using both their 
influence and bribes – to register portions of village common land in their 
names and then sell it on to urban developers.
Land values in the tehsil headquarters where I carried out my field-
work may not have shot up to the same level as in Punjab’s major cities, 
but they also rocketed and were subject to speculation and disputes. The 
most notorious land grabber here was the president of the Youth Akali 
Dal, and a village Sarpanch (elected village headman). The young man, 
whom I will call Gurbachan Singh, started his political career during his 
college days when he was a kabaddi (a muscular Punjabi contact sport) 
player. During those days he proved his worth in several fights against 
rival student groups and eventually defeated rival contenders to the 
student union leadership. People who knew him from college days told 
me that he was always getting into fights and that he had already had a 
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number of cases filed against him back then. However, the feat that estab-
lished his notoriety was his capture and subsequent sale of a widow’s val-
uable urban property. The wealthy widow, from the Bania urban trading 
community, was being harassed by relatives who wanted to gain control 
over numerous assets, which included a bottling plant, several shops and 
a couple of urban residential properties. She asked Gurbachan to help 
her intimidate her relatives and he eventually moved into a wing of her 
house as her permanent bodyguard. The story goes that it was only after 
he had gained her full confidence that he turned on her. People claim that 
he managed to get her to put her large residence in the centre of town in 
his name; some claim that he did so through persuasion and cunning and 
others that he did so through threats. Gurbachan eventually took control 
of the property, kicked the widow out and then used it to host drinking 
parties before transforming it into a commercial property and selling it 
off for 3 crore. One of his relatives said that Gurbachan constantly had 
college girls visiting him there, and even that he started ‘providing’ girls 
to politicians and wealthy businessmen.
Speaking with lawyers I learned that while property and land grabs 
had always happened, the incidence had increased as a result of soaring 
land prices in the last 10 years. Everywhere people told me that up to 10 
years ago property speculation had been a comparatively muted affair; 
people mostly bought property to farm or to live on, not as a speculative 
investment. Many farmers told me that they regretted selling land back 
in the day when an acre of farmland was worth only 2 lakh, and others 
regretted not buying land when it was still affordable. Now an acre in 
rural areas is worth up to 40 lakh.
First the rise in land values brought in speculators from as far as 
Chandigarh. Being outsiders, some such speculators were allegedly 
duped by locals, in collusion with local government officers, into buy-
ing plots without the consent of the actual owners. Government officers 
in charge of verifying people’s identity would fraudulently attest that a 
person was the owner of a plot and wanted to sell it when the person was 
in fact just a dummy. The dummy would sell a plot that was not theirs to 
sell and then share the proceeds with the officers, while the actual owner 
and the buyer were left to fight protracted legal battles. A young man 
who had been involved in such a transaction told me that duped buyers 
rarely got all of their money back, particularly if the kabza group (prop-
erty grabbing group) was well connected politically.
Today it is more difficult to pull this sort of scam off because the 
government has introduced more stringent identity checks including the 
use of Aadhaar (ID) cards and photographs of the parties involved in land 
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transactions. While more difficult to carry out, fraud is nevertheless still 
possible, but according to people in the know it is now increasingly lim-
ited to large transactions involving huge sums of money, and for which a 
tehsildar near retirement might be willing to risk suspension and a pro-
tracted legal battle. The way it is now done is that people obtain other 
people’s land records, scan them onto their computers and then, using 
image manipulation software, replace the owner’s name with theirs. 
They then come to some sort of an agreement with the tehsildar, who 
will somehow enter the amended title into the system. The person who 
told me about this, a young man who earned his livelihood from disputed 
properties, told me that a tehsildar would do this sort of thing only for 
sums of money above at least 10 crore and that they would also generally 
only get involved in such a venture if they were close to retirement and 
thus in any case about to lose their job. He said that if a tehsildar man-
aged to pull this off, his earnings from the fraudulent transaction would 
far outweigh the potential loss of income due to being suspended as well 
as the costs of having to fight a protracted legal battle.
In urban areas today the most common type of property scam 
involves speculators with some political clout – such as Gurbachan 
from the YAD – investing in disputed properties. Here fraud is not as 
obvious, but muscle power and political connections are indispensable. 
Speculators buy disputed properties for a third of their value, sort out 
the dispute with the help of money and/or force, and then sell them off 
for their full value. Disputes most commonly arise when a tenant who 
has proof of long-term residence at a property refuses to pay rent and/
or vacate it. Because of laws protecting tenants it is difficult and in some 
cases even impossible to evict them. For this reason many owners try to 
prevent their tenants from accumulating proof of long-term residence, 
and many owners even try to keep their tenants’ electricity and water 
bills in their own names. In Chandigarh, the state capital, as throughout 
much of Punjab, many property owners would rather leave their prop-
erties vacant than lease them out. Moreover, the issue has gained politi-
cal salience because many wealthy non-resident Indians (NRIs) who live 
abroad in the UK, Canada and Australia are unable to regain possession 
of properties captured by locals – often relatives – in their absence.
The reason why investors in disputed property need some political 
clout is to be able to evict the people occupying the disputed properties 
they purchase. While some may accept money to vacate, many others do 
not. In these cases disputed property speculators need to use force, and 
for this it appears that some degree of complicity from the police, and 
the administration more generally, is required. Gurbachan of the YAD 
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appears to have this necessary support. Lawyers in the sub-divisional 
court complex tell me that while Gurbachan has a couple of cases against 
him dating from his student days, he had no cases registered against him 
during the Akali Dal’s tenure in government; he had the full protection 
of senior politicians in the party. In his lounge I saw pictures of him with 
very high-ranking leaders – who his relatives tell me call him on a regular 
basis – and with the local MLA and Minister, whom he regularly meets. 
Among the reasons why Gurbachan had political support were that he 
helped mobilise crowds for SAD rallies, he intimidated and harassed 
regime opponents and he captured ballot booths during local elections.
Rural land grabs
In many of the above cases, politicians and their intermediaries and cro-
nies were principally involved in land grabs for financial gain. The logic 
of these land grabs was that of capital. However in the case of village 
common lands, politicians facilitated small-scale land grabbing princi-
pally for electoral gain. The logic of these land grabs was therefore closer 
to that of political society: the sphere in which, according to Chatterjee, 
resistance to capital and to primitive accumulation takes place.
The issue of control over village common lands needs to be under-
stood within a rural context where politically-connected farmers, often 
associated with the state government, controlled village politics and were 
able to appropriate the greater bulk of government resources—including 
common lands—in their villages (see Martin 2015). They often did so at 
the expense of their village rivals aligned with opposition parties but also 
at the expense of the Dalits (or Scheduled Castes – SCs). As a result, con-
trol over village common lands was a highly divisive issue. And if political 
society and patronage benefitted anyone in this context it wasn’t the Dalits, 
those who formed the most disadvantaged sector of Punjab society.
Despite their rising independence and assertiveness, members of 
the SCs still do not wield significant power at state or village level in 
Punjab. SCs may have become less submissive and they may be flock-
ing away from Jat-dominated Sikh institutions and to deras;1 they may 
be pressing for a greater share of government resources (Jodhka and 
Prakash 2003) and they may be avoiding agricultural work under the 
command of exacting, dominant-caste Jat farmers (Gupta 2005). Yet my 
observations suggest that because they remain politically dependent on 
the dominant-caste Jats who control panchayats (village councils) they 
continue to be deprived of a wide variety of government entitlements.
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Most notably, politically connected Jats continue to control village 
common lands and also land that should technically be managed by Dalit 
cooperatives. The latter is known as Nazool land: land that once belonged 
predominantly to Muslim evacuees who left for Pakistan at partition 
and which was meant to be handed over to Dalit cooperatives. Jat-caste 
farmers often illegally occupy Nazool land. Farmers with political con-
nections – usually in the ruling party – have likewise captured the larger 
share of shamlaat zameen (village common land), including the share of 
it reserved for Dalits. Village common land belongs to villages as a whole, 
and village panchayats are meant to lease it out to the highest bidder in 
open auctions and on a rotational yearly basis. Decades ago, this land 
used to be used for grazing livestock. However, the growing demand for 
agricultural land has meant that it has gradually been turned over to 
growing Punjab’s staple crops: wheat and rice. The landless have, in the 
process, been deprived of land to graze their livestock, and fewer now 
own livestock (see Jodhka 2014).
Some villages have almost no common land, but others can have 
hundreds of acres of it. The money generated from the lease of this land 
is meant to go to panchayats to be used for village development projects. 
Villages with lots of common land should in theory generate significant 
income from it. A village with 200 acres should, for example, be able to 
generate up to INR 8 million per year. Furthermore, one-third of village 
common land is reserved for Dalits. This should in theory allow them to 
grow some cash crops or fodder for cattle. It should also provide them 
with opportunities to gather firewood, and also – if farmers deny them 
access to their fields – with a place to go to the toilet.
In practice however village common lands have tended to generate 
little income for villages, and both ordinary farmers and Dalits are rou-
tinely deprived of their rightful share in it. In some villages that I visited, 
village common land tended to generate little income because much of it 
was under the kabza (capture) of both rich and poor Jat farmers. In some 
cases the land had been under the kabza of a single family for decades 
and generated no income for villages at all. Such families felt entitled 
to the land because they had worked hard to improve it: levelling sand 
dunes, clearing scrub forest, and investing in tube wells for irrigation. In 
other cases it generated little village income because politically influen-
tial farmers were paying far below market prices to lease the land. I found 
that in a number of villages people were paying no more than INR 8,000 
per acre annually while prices for the lease of irrigated agricultural land 
in Malwa had reached an unprecedented INR 40,000. Moreover I found 
out that a black market in village common land had developed in at least 
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one village. Village common land was being traded but at rates far below 
the market rate for private agricultural land since it was not possible to 
obtain legal ownership over it.
It was often the case that panchayats, in collusion with panchayat 
secretaries and senior politicians, failed to hold the stipulated kulli boli 
(open auctions) for the lease of village common lands. Sarpanches and 
their allies were able to encroach upon village common lands by holding 
these ‘auctions’ in the privacy of their homes without publicly notifying 
villagers. In practice this meant that only Sarpanches and their support-
ers were given the chance to make a bid. Dalits, but also farmers from 
rival political factions often found that they were denied the opportunity 
to lease village land. Senior politicians were often complicit to the extent 
that they failed to take administrative measures to redress the situation, 
particularly when it benefitted loyal party workers and supporters. As 
will be illustrated below, they also sometimes actively tried to prevent 
encroachers from being evicted.
In order to get around the provision that a third of the land was 
reserved for Dalits, Sarpanches used dummy candidates to make their 
bids. The dummies were often their own farm servants. Thus, on paper 
the land was allotted to a Dalit, but in practice it was that Dalit’s master 
who actually cultivated the land.2 Dalits did not always protest because 
they did not have the tools to farm with and because panchayats had 
failed to equip village lands with tube wells. This meant that only farm-
ers who owned tube wells on land adjacent to particular plots of village 
common land could actually cultivate it. During my fieldwork, Dalits in 
some villages that I visited blamed the government for failing to provide 
them with the equipment necessary to farm, and for failing to invest in 
tube wells that would allow them to irrigate plots of village land.
During fieldwork in 2013–4 many Sarpanches were involved in 
lengthy court cases aiming to clear village common lands of encroach-
ers. The ostensible aim of this legal procedure was to boost village 
revenues. The government had an interest in the process too, because 
roughly a third of the income generated was to go into state coffers. 
These cases were highly contested. The left-leaning Dakonda farmers’ 
union, for example, strongly opposed this clearance because it risked 
depriving farmers of land that they had improved and cultivated for 
decades – some since Independence. It also opposed clearing village 
common lands of encroachers on the grounds that the rule of the mar-
ket would dramatically raise the price for leasing village common land 
and would put it beyond the reach of ordinary small farmers who could 
barely make a living. Village-level Dakonda Union leaders also alleged 
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that the government was making way for corporate agriculture, although 
the extent to which this was the case was unclear. Pointing to a perhaps 
more immediate threat, they asserted that the policy did not necessar-
ily do away with the malpractices associated with village common land 
and that it was frequently implemented in ways that harmed the interests 
of those in the political opposition. The following three cases illustrate 
some of these dynamics, and also how politicians often protected some 
encroachers at the expense of others and thus ultimately hampered the 
emergence of a workable joint solution to the issue of control over village 
common lands.
Case I: Daroli
The case of Daroli illustrates how the issue of control over village com-
mon lands was a source of conflict and acrimony, and also demonstrates 
the role of politicians in exacerbating these conflicts and acrimonies. It 
illustrates how politicians, with their ad hoc interventions, could fail to 
effectively protect people from dispossession.
In this village, Kuldip Singh Kombhoz initiated the process of clear-
ing village common land of encroachers when he was Sarpanch from 
2008–13. He claimed to want to improve the 60 acres of common land 
in order to increase village revenues for development. However, his 
detractors claimed that he merely wanted to evict his political rivals from 
the land and redistribute it to his supporters. A local newspaper even 
reported that Kuldip had cleared village common lands of encroachers 
merely to replace them with his friends, relatives and supporters. He 
denied this, claiming that the newspaper in question had fabricated the 
story. They had purportedly blackmailed him by telling them that unless 
he paid them some money they would fabricate a negative story about 
him. Whatever the case may be, he was able to evict the encroachers who 
had taken hold of 36 acres of village common land in 2012. He was proud 
of his achievement, and claimed that thanks to his efforts the village had 
earned INR 1.2 million from its lands.
His policy had, however, proven to be highly divisive and in 2014 
villagers were reluctant to place any bids on village common land, 
because doing so risked antagonising those who had traditionally cul-
tivated particular plots of land but who had been evicted. The Dakonda 
Kisan Union had become involved on behalf of the farmers and its mem-
bers had clashed with the police when the latter had come to remove the 
farmers from the land they were occupying.
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Kuldip Singh claimed that the Minister for Panchayats and Rural 
Development had initially supported his initiative, but when the minister 
had seen that it might cost him party votes he had not only backtracked 
but also turned against him. He claimed that the minister had first started 
supporting the farmers by helping them obtain court stays that allowed 
some of them to remain in possession of the land for an extra year. He 
also claimed that the minister was in all likelihood responsible for the 
fact that the construction of an electrical line through the village com-
mon lands had been halted. Without electricity he would not be able to 
install tube wells on the land and village revenues from village common 
lands would not rise. This, he explained, served the interests of the farm-
ers because they would be able to continue renting village common lands 
at the lower rate for unirrigated land. He also claimed that the minis-
ter had once told the farmers that if he – Kuldip – continued to insist 
on the issue that they would give him a good beating. The minister had 
apparently said this during one of his meetings with his constituents at 
his mansion outside Patiala. Kuldip even claimed that the minister had 
encouraged the farmers to fabricate a case against him and supported 
them in the endeavour. So he was taken to court for allegedly building a 
part of his house on village common land. The case was spurious, and it 
failed, but it worsened village level animosities.
Balvinder Singh, the owner of four acres of land, confirmed that 
the minister had supported the ‘encroaching’ farmers, and helped some 
of them obtain temporary stay orders from the court. He and his parents 
and grandparents before him had cultivated five acres of village common. 
His grandfather had cleared the land of tibbas (sandy hillocks) and made 
the land cultivable. The land was irrigated with water from a polluted 
river that ran past the village, but he claimed that the dirt in the water 
meant that he did not have to use much fertiliser to obtain good crops. 
He rejected Kuldip’s claim to the effect that he was an encroacher. He said 
that he had always paid to cultivate the land but that he could not pro-
vide full proof of this because Kuldip, while he was Sarpanch, had never 
provided him with receipts for his payments. He had relatives who were 
close to the minister; they had got the minster somehow to intervene in 
the court case on his behalf, and he had obtained a stay order. However 
the minister’s intervention was merely ad hoc and temporary and he was 
eventually forced to vacate the land and forgo half of his income.
The issue of village common land polarised the village, and those 
who didn’t want to get embroiled in the conflict were reluctant to place 
their bids on land that others had improved and cultivated all their lives. 
The current Sarpanch was an SC who had obtained the post because it 
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was reserved. He told me that he did not want to get involved in this con-
tentious issue, and that as a Chamar he could not afford to antagonise 
anyone. It was a highly contentious issue because people’s incomes – and 
some people’s very subsistence – depended upon the village common 
land that they had encroached upon. One Jat whom we interviewed 
told me that the politicking of village leaders had ruined him. He had 
cultivated some 10 acres of village common land his entire life and now 
because of Kuldip he had almost nothing left. However, he also blamed 
the ruling Akali Dal for letting it happen and claimed that the minister’s 
efforts to help them obtain a stay order were not particularly helpful: that 
he had made a token gesture out of political expediency. The Jat owned 
only one and a half acres, which was not enough to live from. On top of 
that he was unable to work due to back problems and did not know how 
he would make a living.
Case II: Tullewal
The case of Tullewal likewise illustrates how the most senior local Akali 
politician ended up supporting encroachers because he feared the polit-
ical fallout that would result from evicting those illegally encroaching 
upon village common lands. Again, however, he ended up supporting 
one faction at the expense of another and thus contributed to further 
dividing the village into two irreconcilable camps. As in Daroli, he exac-
erbated village factional rivalries and thereby contributed to preventing 
villagers from finding a joint solution regarding the control and use of 
village common lands.
Harpal, the village Sarpanch until 2013, had initiated a judicial pro-
cess against encroachers and had managed to clear some 56 (of roughly 
90 total) acres of village common land. He had also managed to obtain 
six tube wells from the government to irrigate some of it. The process 
had, Harpal claimed, been expedited by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. Harpal’s chief village rivals, Malvinder and his sup-
porters, had allegedly placed spurious corruption cases against him in 
response, because his actions threatened them. Malvinder had captured 
four acres of village common land and Sukhvinder – an ally and farmer 
union leader – had allegedly captured 13 acres. Despite his efforts how-
ever, Harpal was not able to have either evicted because the minister had 
prevented the police from doing so despite court orders. He claimed that 
the minister was ‘playing politics’ because he feared that by evicting them 
he would lose votes. He had become ‘frightened’ when he had seen that 
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the farmers’ union had gathered a large number of people in protest; he 
worried that it would cost him not only the support of the Tullewal villag-
ers but also that of the broader public, because news of the protests had 
come out in the newspapers.
Partly as a result of all the unrest caused by the clearing of the 
village common lands, Harpal lost the 2013 panchayat elections to 
Malvinder, his chief rival. Harpal had been very close to the minister, 
and he had many pictures to prove it, but the relationship had somewhat 
soured after the minister had started supporting the encroachers. Later, 
after Harpal had lost the 2013 elections, the minister started collaborat-
ing with Malvinder – and was doing so even though Malvinder was not 
a loyal Akali. He did so, according to Harpal, because that was allegedly 
the way of politicians: they knew no loyalties, and all they cared about 
were votes. Harpal, and five others who were there on one of the occa-
sions when I interviewed him, told me that Malvinder had held the lat-
est auction for village common land in the secrecy of his home. He said 
that Malvinder had bribed the Block Development Officer in order to do 
so, and that he had the support of the local Akali Minister. As a result, 
none of those present had been given the chance to place their bids and 
obtain some land. On the other hand, Malvinder and his friends had all 
obtained land and had secretly agreed to ensure that the leasing price 
for any plot should not rise above INR 20,000. Harpal complained that 
the panchayat should in reality be obtaining over INR 35,000 per acre for 
that land because almost all of it was now irrigated with the tube wells 
he had obtained from the government. Sukhvinder, one of Malvinder’s 
allies, seemed to give this latter claim some credence when he told me 
that he was paying INR 22,000 per acre. Moreover, Harpal claimed that 
Malvinder was technically banned from renting village common land 
because he was a defaulter: he had, over several years, failed to pay a sin-
gle cent for the four acres of village common land that he had cultivated. 
In order to circumvent this hurdle, Malvinder had entered the name of 
his Dalit farm servant as the new tenant for that land.
Sukhvinder and Malvinder obviously had an entirely different 
perspective on the issue. Both accused Harpal of initiating the clear-
ance of village common lands through the courts – not because he was 
interested in augmenting village revenues but rather because he bore 
a grudge against them as a result of their longstanding political rivalry 
at village level. They also suggested that if he was interested in increas-
ing village revenues it was merely in order to be able to steal more from 
the panchayat. Malvinder accused Harpal of gross corruption, and had 
placed a case against him for embezzling over INR 400,000 during the 
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construction of a stretch of road and some associated drains. Malvinder 
said that Harpal had stolen far more than that during his tenure but that 
he did not have the evidence necessary to take him to court for all of 
the corruption cases. The case against Harpal was successful at the tehsil 
level, and he was ordered to pay a INR 355,000 fine. But Harpal subse-
quently placed an appeal and was eventually exonerated.
Case III: Fatehpur
The case of Fatehpur likewise illustrates the socially divisive nature 
of political interventions in the issue of village common lands, and 
most clearly illustrates the extent to which the complicity of politi-
cians could benefit the few at the expense of the rest. The case is dif-
ferent to those of Daroli and Tullewal to the extent that in Fatehpur 
the clearance of village common lands was complete by the time I fin-
ished fieldwork in 2014. As a result of the implementation of public 
auctions, village common lands had become subject to market values 
and leasing them had become more expensive. This, as the Dakonda 
farmers’ union leaders had feared, meant that poorer farmers ceased 
to be able to lease village common land.
Legal disputes for control over village common land in Fatehpur 
started in 1986 when Nirmal Singh took Khem Singh to court for captur-
ing 86 of a total of 180 acres of village common land. Both Khem Singh’s 
rivals and his supporters told me that Khem Singh’s family had controlled 
that land for several decades thanks to their political connections, and 
had worked to improve it. Khem Singh and his two brothers only owned 
four acres of land, and it was widely agreed that they had been able to 
build a large house with all the modern domestic appliances and to pur-
chase two new four-wheel drive cars and also a new tractor thanks to 
their control over those 86 acres of village common land.
Khem Singh had been involved in court cases against Nirmal 
Singh and other rivals over this land for over three decades. Nirmal 
Singh, and a friend of his, eventually landed in jail for the murder of a 
woman who he had purchased some land from. His successor as faction 
leader, Naib Singh, alleged that Nirmal Singh was innocent and that 
it was Khem Singh who had set him up with the help of his police and 
political contacts. Despite the court cases against him, Khem Singh’s 
family had been able to continue cultivating at least some of the village 
common land and in 2013 he and others told me that he was renting 30 
acres at INR 20,000 per acre.
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Aligned with the ruling SAD, Khem Singh won the 2013 local elec-
tions. The previous Sarpanch had been a Dalit Mazhbi Sikh – aligned with 
the Congress party and with the Nirmal Singh faction in the village – who 
had not been able to complete his term because Khem Singh who had 
close relations with the local Akali leader had had him suspended. The 
Dalit Sarpanch had apparently performed the auction for the village com-
mon land in the privacy of an allied Jat farmer’s home without advising 
anyone but his own allies, and on a Sunday when none of the concerned 
block-level officials could attend. This blatant and blundering act – in the 
words of his own allies – got him suspended, and Khem Singh finished 
his term for him before going on to win the 2013 local elections. While 
not entirely denying that there had been irregularities in that auction, 
one member of Nirmal Singh’s faction said that the only reason why the 
Sarpanch was suspended was that he and his supporters were affiliated 
with the Congress party at the time of an Akali government. He claimed 
that there was always some ‘little irregularity’ in village common land 
auctions, but that the Akalis only turned it into an issue when it was 
members of the opposition who were responsible for these irregularities.
Once in power, Khem Singh was said to have performed village com-
mon land auctions according to the rules, and everyone who wanted to 
had managed to place their bids, but the cost of renting village common 
land shot up dramatically. One of Khem Singh’s supporters, an impover-
ished Jat who collected and sold milk, told me that he used to rent three 
acres of village common land but that he could no longer afford to do so. 
He had rented the land at INR 10,000 per acre, but the price had shot up to 
INR 45,000. Naib Singh cited the same numbers and told me that although 
he still cultivated village common land it had become too risky for him to 
continue to do so. If crops failed for some reason, he would make a loss. 
Various people told me that the rental price had risen so much that only 
the richest farmers could now cultivate village common land. One person 
told me that roughly since 2012, only 20 people cultivated village common 
land: all of them wealthy farmers. Prior to 2012, however, over 40 peo-
ple had cultivated it. Nevertheless, Khem Singh paid only INR 20,000 per 
acre while everyone else was paying INR 40–45,000 per acre. One of his 
supporters said that the reason for this was that the land in question did 
not have any tube wells on it. However, Naib Singh told me that the land 
did not have any tube wells because Khem Singh had intentionally avoided 
placing any on that particular area of land in order to be able to lease it 
at half the rate. But in fact, the land was irrigated because Khem Singh 
possessed two tube wells on his own four adjacent acres, and used them to 
irrigate those 30 acres. One person even alleged that Khem Singh was, in 
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fact, not paying any rent at all for 10 of those 30 acres, but there was – as 
with many of these allegations – no way for me to confirm this.
Some people also had mixed views about what Khem Singh had 
done with the money that was flowing into the panchayat’s coffers. The 
village was earning roughly INR 4.5 million from its village common 
lands, and Khem Singh had used this money to fix all the village gut-
ters and pave its alleyways with cement bricks. However, many of his 
Congress party opponents alleged that he was appropriating a share 
of the new revenue stream. They believed that even more works could 
have been carried out in that village with those revenues and that Khem 
Singh was undoubtedly taking a share. They claimed, however, that it 
was difficult for them to confirm their suspicions because Khem Singh 
kept the village panchayat records in his home. Local government regu-
lations stipulate that these records should be freely available for public 
scrutiny; in practice Sarpanches tend to keep them in the secrecy of their 
homes. Moreover, they claimed that no one was willing to place a Right 
to Information (RTI) request because people believed it would be futile 
and potentially dangerous. Futile because the Akali government would 
botch any investigation against a party loyalist; dangerous because the 
Akali government might help Khem Singh place fabricated and spuri-
ous police charges against those seeking to investigate him (see Martin 
2015, 2018).
Last but not least, there was further cause for acrimony because 
Khem Singh had allotted some village common land for subsidised gov-
ernment housing plots. This had given rise to yet another legal dispute 
because the land granted was almost entirely cultivated by Khem Singh’s 
opponents. These opponents alleged that Khem Singh had purposefully 
sought to harm their interests. They told me that they had proposed an 
alternative, ‘better place’ for those plots, but that Khem had insisted on 
putting them on land that they cultivated. In 2014, the plots were already 
demarcated and 11 persons had moved in and built houses. However, 
many people – mostly landless Dalits – were hesitant to move in and build 
their houses, saying that the legal dispute about the placement of those 
plots meant that their legal status was unclear. Those who had already 
moved in told me that they had not yet been granted land titles, and 
that without land titles they could not hook up to the electricity supply. 
Moreover, they complained that they could not defecate in adjacent fields 
because those fields belonged to the very Jats who had issued the legal 
challenge against those five marla plots.3 One Chamar woman told me 
that the Jats had hurled abuse at her and threatened to beat her and her 
husband up if they ever dared make use of their fields again.
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Conclusions
The first thing to emerge from these case studies is that political soci-
ety may protect some people from the expansion of capital, but not all. 
The context described is one in which politicians bend and break the law, 
often – but not always – for members of an already comparatively priv-
ileged class. Many of those for whom they bend, break or simply fail to 
ensure the application of the law are even very privileged. In this pro-
cess, the most disadvantaged – namely the Dalits – have been and con-
tinue to be deprived of their lawful share of village common land. The 
argument could nevertheless be made that these case studies illustrate 
how the operations of political society do, nevertheless, put the brakes on 
processes of accumulation by dispossession. Besides large-scale farmers, 
a number of smaller farmers were seemingly able to sustain their liveli-
hoods thanks to the fact that politicians didn’t press the administration to 
apply the law and evict encroachers.
As members of the Dakonda farmer’s union warned, and as villag-
ers in Khanpur confirmed, allowing open and market-based auctions for 
village common lands placed village common lands beyond the reach of 
all except the richest farmers. In other words, allowing the market to rule 
would contribute to the gradual expansion of capital and to the dispos-
session of petty capitalists.
The above case studies certainly suggest that there is some truth to 
the idea that the ad hoc arrangements of political society put a break on 
dispossession. However because of the frequently partisan nature of how 
this is done, it is a divisive practice that prevents farmers from getting 
together to find a solution to the issue of village common lands. In all of 
the three cases above, political interventions had benefitted one faction 
at the expense of another, and had contributed to exacerbating existing 
rivalries.
As I have argued elsewhere (Martin 2018), the Akali Dal governed in 
a highly partisan manner. It protected supporters, regardless of whether 
or not they were corrupt, and it harassed political opponents on the basis 
of both real and fabricated corruption charges and allegations. Thus in 
the case of Tullewal described above, the minister allegedly intervened 
on Harpal’s behalf to help him escape corruption charges. As already 
noted in the first section, accusations to the effect that the government 
supported its corrupt intermediaries were common. Gurbachan  – the 
YAD thug and Sarpanch discussed above – was, for example, widely 
believed to have full police cover for his activities. This became crystal 
clear to me when I saw him capture a polling booth in full view of the 
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police during the 2013 local elections. The police did nothing as he and 
his comrades barred Congress supporters’ entry into the polling station 
and then attacked them with sticks, swords and stones.
Other cases were perhaps less clear but accusations at the very 
least point to the fact that people believed that Akalis had impunity. In 
Fatehpur, for example, people believed that it would be futile to inves-
tigate Khem Singh for corruption because the administration would not 
be responsive. Some even feared physical harassment at the hands of 
either thugs or the police. When on the other hand people were opposed 
to the minister or to his party, they were harassed. In Gurbachan’s village, 
Congress party opponents who tried to resist Gurbachan’s capture of the 
polling booth ended up facing attempted murder charges. In Daroli, 
when Kuldip obstinately pursued the clearing of village common lands, 
the minister allegedly helped manufacture a spurious case against him.
As I have argued elsewhere (Martin 2018) such partisan political 
interventions in village affairs exacerbated village-level disputes and 
animosities. These interventions had the effect of fuelling and escalat-
ing disputes that may not have otherwise flared up. Everywhere, people 
told me that it was politicians and political parties that caused people 
to fight, and that made village life unbearable. An opposition Congress 
party worker put it this way:
Politicians don’t resolve disputes; they aggravate them. If someone 
asks me to help resolve some dispute, I’ll approach the opposing 
party and try to engineer a samjhota (compromise). An Akali party 
worker will, on the other hand, use his power to get the police to 
bring charges against the opposing party and, as a consequence, the 
parties will never speak to each other again.
What consequence did political meddling have for farmers’ prospects of 
finding a workable solution to the issue of control over village common 
lands? In this context, the effect of the ad hoc political meddling – char-
acteristic of political society – was to keep farmers fighting each other 
and trying to kick each other off village common lands, not to ensure 
that all of their livelihoods were shielded from the expansion of capital. 
Lack of unity meant that – in the end – farmers were sometimes unable to 
resist the clearing of village common lands. The process had been com-
pleted in Khanpur and the Akali minister’s attempts to obtain a stay order 
and to stop the police from evicting encroachers in Daroli was merely a 
stopgap measure.
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Finally, I would like to suggest that there is a sense in which these 
ad hoc measures to facilitate illegal encroachment were in fact ultimately 
exploitative. Both politicians and Sarpanches could exploit the legal 
uncertainty of these arrangements for electoral gain. The case of the five 
marla housing plots in Fatehpur clearly illustrates how this worked, and 
how the precariousness of extra-legal arrangements could serve to cre-
ate semi-captive vote-banks. Khem Singh had granted people land over 
which there was a legal dispute, meaning that the possibility of putting 
those plots in their name was uncertain. Members of the opposition 
Congress party faction had mounted a legal challenge to keep control of 
that particular area of village common land because they had been culti-
vating it for decades. A number of villagers asserted that Khem Singh – in 
collusion with the MLA – had purposely put the prospective plot own-
ers in this precarious position, claiming that if he had given them secure 
land titles he would have had no guarantee that they would vote for him 
the next time round. As it was, however, Khem Singh could claim that it 
was his opponents who were preventing the SCs from getting the housing 
plots, and that their only chance to secure their property titles was by 
rallying behind him.
A similar dynamic seemed to underwrite the capture of village 
common lands. People aligned with the local Akali minister and his 
local allies were more likely to be able to continue illegally controlling 
and cultivating village common lands than were members of the polit-
ical opposition. The latter were the ones most frequently evicted from 
village common lands while those with government support seemed able 
to maintain their grip on village common lands even when they paid little 
or nothing to cultivate them.
However, their hold over that land was contingent upon the con-
tinued good will of Akali politicians and upon the latter’s willingness to 
prevent the Ministry of Panchayats from taking action against them, and 
even upon Akali politicians’ willingness to hold the police back when 
courts had ordered their eviction. Were they to suddenly start opposing 
the SAD by joining – for example – the Congress party, their semi-legal 
hold over village common lands would likely be subject to sudden legal 
scrutiny. In other words, the legal precariousness that is an intrinsic part 
of informal arrangements in political society allowed politicians to hold 
citizens to account for their political loyalties and even arguably for their 
electoral choices.
So even if politicians did sometimes help to put a temporary brake 
on accumulation by dispossession through ad hoc and clientelistic 
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favours, they were at least partly responsible for the lack of an adequate 
solution to the problem of village common lands. Ultimately however it 
is important to keep in mind that they were crucial parties to processes of 
accumulation by dispossession. The literature on land grabs cited above 
shows that in Punjab – as in other states in India – it is politicians who 
are brokering land deals for local and international corporations. This 
is particularly true in the context of post-liberalisation India, where – as 
Kanchan Chandra (2015) has argued – state-level political corruption 
revolves around brokering land deals for big money. As indicated at the 
outset, it is also often politicians themselves who are involved in acquir-
ing land – through occasionally dubious means – for their own purposes.
Notes
1. Frequently non-denominational religious institutions centred around holy men.
2. This, and the capture of Nazool land, led to the emergence in 2013 of a movement called ‘Zam-
een Prapti Sangarsh Committee’ in the district of Sangrur. The movement seeks to ensure that 
Dalits obtain their rightful share of village common land and that Nazool land is handed back 
to them. More ambitiously, the movement also hopes to reduce the ceiling on landownership 
to 10 acres.
3. One marla is roughly the equivalent of 25 square metres, but marlas have been defined differ-
ently in different periods and regions of the subcontinent.
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